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Abstract—Forensic analysis of digital photographs relies on intrinsic statistical traces introduced at the time of their acquisition or
subsequent editing. Such traces are often removed by post-processing (e.g., down-sampling and re-compression applied upon
distribution in the Web) which inhibits reliable provenance analysis. Increasing adoption of computational methods within digital
cameras further complicates the process and renders explicit mathematical modeling infeasible. While this trend challenges forensic
analysis even in near-acquisition conditions, it also creates new opportunities. This paper explores end-to-end optimization of the entire
image acquisition and distribution workflow to facilitate reliable forensic analysis at the end of the distribution channel, where
state-of-the-art forensic techniques fail. We demonstrate that a neural network can be trained to replace the entire photo development
pipeline, and jointly optimized for high-fidelity photo rendering and reliable provenance analysis. Such optimized neural imaging
pipeline allowed us to increase image manipulation detection accuracy from approx. 45% to over 90%. The network learns to introduce
carefully crafted artifacts, akin to digital watermarks, which facilitate subsequent manipulation detection. Analysis of performance
trade-offs indicates that most of the gains can be obtained with only minor distortion. The findings encourage further research towards
building more reliable imaging pipelines with explicit provenance-guaranteeing properties.
Index Terms—imaging pipeline optimization; photo manipulation detection; image forgery detection; neural imaging; image forensics;
photo response non-uniformity
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Assessment and protection of the integrity of digital pho-
tographs is one of the most challenging and important prob-
lems in multimedia communications. Photographs are com-
monly used for documentation of important events, and as
such, require efficient and reliable authentication protocols.
Our media acquisition and distribution workflows are built
with entertainment in mind, and not only fail to provide
explicit security features, but actually work against them.
Image compression standards exploit heavy redundancy
of visual signals to reduce communication payload, but
optimize for human perception alone. Security extensions
of popular standards [1] do not address modern distribution
requirements, like re-compression or device adaptation, and
lack in adoption.
Two main approaches to photo content authentication in-
clude [2–4]: (1) pro-active protection based on digital signa-
tures or watermarking; (2) passive forensic analysis that ex-
ploits statistical traces introduced by the acquisition pipeline
or subsequent editing. While pro-active solutions provide
superior performance and protection features (e.g., precise
tampering localization [5], or reconstruction of tampered
content [6, 7]), it requires explicit generation of protected
image copies. Such functionality should be integrated in
digital cameras [8], but vendors lack incentives to introduce
and support such mechanisms. Registration of photographs
and their signatures in a central repository [9] works for lim-
ited deployments, such as law-enforcement/public safety
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applications [10]. Several companies and researchers are
currently experimenting with blockchain-based reposito-
ries [11–13].
Passive forensics, on the other hand, relies on our knowl-
edge of the photo acquisition pipeline, and statistical arti-
facts introduced by its successive steps. While this approach
is well suited for analyzing any digital photograph, it often
falls short due to complex post-processing. Digital images
are not only heavily compressed, but also enhanced or even
manipulated before, during or after dissemination. Popular
images have many online incarnations, and tracing their
distribution and evolution has spawned a new field of
image phylogeny [14, 15] which relies on visual differences
between multiple images to infer their relationships and
editing history. However, phylogeny does not provide any
tools to reason about the authenticity or history of individ-
ual images. As a result, reliable authentication of real-world
online images remains untractable [16].
At the moment, forensic analysis often yields useful
results in near-acquisition scenarios. Analysis of native im-
ages straight from the camera is more reliable, and even
seemingly benign implementation details, like rounding
operators in image signal processors [17], provide useful
clues. Unfortunately, most forensic traces quickly become
unreliable with post-processing. One of the most reliable
forensic tools involves analysis of the imaging sensor’s
artifacts (the photo response non-uniformity, PRNU) which
can be used both for source attribution and content authen-
tication problems [18].
Rapid progress in computational imaging will soon chal-
lenge forensics even in near-acquisition authentication. In
the pursuit of better image quality and convenience, digi-
tal cameras (especially smartphones) employ sophisticated
post-processing, and final photographs cease to resemble
the original signals captured by the sensor(s). Adoption
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Fig. 1. Optimization of the image acquisition and distribution channel to facilitate photo provenance analysis. The neural imaging pipeline (NIP) is
trained to develop images that both resemble the desired target images, but also retain meaningful forensic clues at the end of complex distribution
channels.
of machine learning has recently challenged many long-
standing limitations of digital photography, such as: high-
quality low-light photography [19, 20]; single-shot HDR
with overexposed content recovery [21]; high-quality digital
zoom from multiple shots [22]; enhancement of smartphone-
captured images with weak supervision from DSLR pho-
tos [23].
These remarkable results demonstrate tangible benefits
of replacing the entire acquisition pipeline with neural
networks. Hence, it will be necessary to assess the impact
of neural imaging pipelines on existing forensic protocols.
While important, such evaluation can be seen as damage
assessment and control rather than a solution for the future.
We believe it is imperative to consider new opportunities
for security-oriented design of cameras and multimedia
dissemination channels that come with adoption of neural
imaging processors.
In this paper, we propose to optimize neural imaging
pipelines to improve photo provenance analysis capabilities
in complex distribution channels. We exploit end-to-end
optimization of the entire photo acquisition and distribution
channel to ensure that reliable authentication decisions can
be made even after complex post-processing, where classical
forensics fails (Fig. 1). We believe the ongoing revolution
in camera design creates a unique opportunity to address
the limitations of our current technology. While adoption of
authentication watermarking was stifled by the necessity to
modify camera design, our approach exploits the flexibility
of neural networks to learn relevant integrity-preserving
features within the expressive power of the model. With
solid understanding of neural imaging pipelines, and a rare
opportunity of replacing the well-established and security-
oblivious technology, we have a chance to significantly im-
prove photo authentication capabilities in next-generation
devices.
We aim to inspire discussion about novel, learnable cam-
era designs that could improve photo provenance analysis
capabilities. The capability of rapidly learning the entire
imaging pipeline for novel hardware components [24, 25]
opens new perspectives for security-oriented enhancements.
We demonstrate that it is possible to optimize the pipeline
to significantly improve detection of photo manipulation
at the end of a complex real-world distribution channel,
where state-of-the-art deep-learning techniques fail. The
main contributions of our work include:
1) The first end-to-end optimization of the imaging
pipeline with explicit photo provenance objectives;
2) The first security-oriented discussion of neural
imaging pipelines and the inherent trade-offs;
3) Significant improvement of forensic analysis perfor-
mance in challenging, heavily post-processed con-
ditions;
4) First discussion of the impact of computational
imaging on the stability of conventional forensics
protocols.
This work is an extension of our conference paper [26].
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review related
work on computational imaging, application of machine
learning to imaging pipeline design, as well as conventional
methods of photo authentication (Section 2). Then, we dis-
cuss the application of neural imaging pipelines, and assess
their impact on classical forensics analysis (Section 3). The
following sections explain the proposed pipeline modeling
and optimization approach (Section 4) and present the re-
sults of experimental evaluation (Section 5.2). Finally, we
conclude and discuss the perspectives for future research
(Section 6).
To facilitate further research in this direction, and
enable reproduction of our results, our neural imaging
toolbox is available online at https://github.com/pkorus/
neural-imaging.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review recent trends in computational
photography, including imaging pipeline design, and ap-
proximation of image processing operators with artificial
neural networks. We also discuss existing techniques and
3research trends in image authentication, including both
watermarking and forensics-based solutions.
2.1 Imaging Pipelines and Processors
Learning individual steps of the imaging pipeline has a long
history [27] but regained momentum in recent years thanks
to deep learning. Naturally, the research focused on the
most difficult operations, i.e., demosaicing [25, 28–30] and
denoising [31–33]. New techniques delivered not only better
performance, but also additional features. Gharbi et al. pro-
posed a convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture
for joint demosaicing and denoising [28]. Syu et al. used
CNNs for joint optimization of the color filter array and a
corresponding demosaicing filter [25]. Researchers are also
training networks to unprocess RGB images to RAW inputs,
which aims to obtain more realistic training data, imperative
in high-quality denoising [34].
Optimization efforts have recently expanded to a com-
plete replacement of the pipeline with learned components.
The L3 model by Jiang et al. approximates the entire photo
development process with a large collection of local lin-
ear filters [24]. The model aims to facilitate research and
development efforts for non-standard camera designs, like
custom RGBW (red-green-blue-white) and RGB-NIR (red-
green-blue-near-infra-red) color filter arrays. The FlexISP
model can be optimized for various camera designs and
image formation models [35]. Optimization objectives can
include not only standard metrics like demosaicing or de-
noising performance, but also inverse problems like camera
shake and out-of-focus blur reduction. Chen et al. trained
a UNet model [36] to develop high-quality photographs in
low-light conditions [19] by exposing it to paired examples
of images taken with short and long exposure. The network
learned to develop high-quality well-exposed color pho-
tographs from underexposed raw input, and yielded better
performance than traditional image post-processing based
on brightness adjustment and denoising. Eilertsen et al. also
used a UNet model to develop high-dynamic range images
from a single shot [21]. The network learned not only tone
mapping, but also recovery of overexposed highlights. This
significantly simplifies HDR photography by eliminating
bracketing and ghosting artifacts.
In contrast to mainstream research which prioritizes
image quality, adoption of neural networks allows to op-
timize not only for human perception, but also for machine
consumption. Buckler et al. prioritize low-power processing
given machine perception objectives [37]. A company Algo-
lux [38] optimizes imaging pipelines for object detection in
autonomous vehicles.
Machine learning can also simplify image fusion, which
is increasingly adopted in photography [20, 39–41]. Hasinoff
et al. proposed a burst pipeline, which takes multiple short-
exposure photographs and combines them to improve low-
light and HDR performance [40]. Their pipeline uses a sim-
ple pairwise filter, which successively merges new frames
into a reference image. To eliminate ghosting on moving
objects, fast sub-pixel alignment is used. Building upon this
technique, the most recent smartphones seek improvements
in extremely low-light conditions [20]. A recent digital
camera (Light L16 [41]) uses 16 lenses and sensors with
different configurations to provide high-quality imaging
capabilities within a small form factor. The camera activates
various groups of sensors depending on capture settings,
and relies on a proprietary image fusion engine to develop
the photographs and deliver advanced features, e.g., post-
capture depth of field control.
2.2 Image Enhancement and Processing
CNN architectures are also considered for image enhance-
ment and processing. Ignatov et al. developed a system
for smartphone photo quality enhancement [42]. The au-
thors captured synchronized pairs of images from low-
cost mobile cameras, and high-quality DSLRs. Then, they
trained a neural network to regress high-quality photos
given low-quality input. In a follow up work, they extended
the approach to dispense with strong supervision. They
adopted an image translation-based approach which yields
competitive results despite training on unpaired low-quality
and high-quality photo collections [23].
Automatic photo adjustment using neural networks is
another active research topic [43, 44]. Deep networks were
shown to be effective not only in subjective style enhance-
ment, but also in fast approximation of complex image
processing operators, e.g., tone mapping, or dehazing [45].
Recent work by Gharbi et al. suggests that thanks to
complex feature detection capabilities, deep architectures
can learn not only global processing operators, but also
subtle, contextual adjustments, e.g., brightening of human
faces [46].
A recent trend in post-processing involves simulation of
shallow depth-of-field in low-cost smart-phone photogra-
phy. The most successful systems combine face location,
semantic image segmentation, and depth information to
synthesize a convincing blur of the scene background [47].
Depth information can be estimated using either multi-
camera setups, parallax from subtle camera movements, or
dual-pixel auto-focus hardware. Synthesis methods range
from simple composition models up to approximations of
light field processing.
2.3 Digital Image Forensics
Forensic analysis addresses questions regarding photo
provenance and processing history, and considers either
physical integrity (consistency of lighting, shadows, perspec-
tive, etc) or digital integrity (consistency of low-level signal
features) [2, 3]. The former are typically manual, or semi-
automatic, as they require good high-level understanding
of image content and laws of physics. The latter techniques
are automatic, and rely on intrinsic statistical traces intro-
duced at the time of photo acquisition (or manipulation).
Based on our knowledge of the standard imaging pipeline,
researchers have proposed many techniques for problems
ranging from source attribution to content authentication.
The initial research emphasized formal mathematical mod-
eling of image processing operators and corresponding de-
tectors. Increasingly complex post-processing forced a tran-
sition to data-driven techniques. However, recent evaluation
revealed limited applicability of both approaches on real-
world data [16].
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Fig. 2. Adoption of a neural imaging pipeline to develop color RGB images from raw sensor measurements: (top) the standard imaging pipeline;
(bottom) the neural imaging pipeline.
The current research focuses on three main directions: (1)
learning deep features relevant to low-level forensic analysis
for problems like manipulation detection [48–50], identifi-
cation of the social network of origin[51], camera model
identification [52–54], or detection of artificially generated
content [55–58]; (2) adoption of high-level vision to auto-
mate manual analysis that exposes physical inconsistencies,
such as reflections [59, 60], or shadows [61]; (3) addressing
counter-forensic and adversarial attacks [62].
The bulk of forensics research assumes a standard imag-
ing pipeline, which increasingly ceases to hold due to in-
creasing adoption of computational methods. Early symp-
toms are visible even in older devices, where image sta-
bilization hampers attribution and authentication of video
recordings [63, 64]. We expect that such problems will
quickly deteriorate, and become pervasive even for static
photography which starts to rely on advanced image fusion
techniques (such as the burst imaging pipeline [40], and
multi-sensor setups [41]).
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently no
efforts to assess the impact of new pipelines on existing
forensics protocols. We are also not aware of any studies
addressing the sensitivity of forensics models to the use of
different pipelines (e.g., different RAW development soft-
ware). Recent research in image steganography argues that
even the same pipeline with different acquisition settings
(e.g., ISO sensitivity) can be considered a different source
with distinct statistical properties [65, 66]. While this obser-
vations awaits a rigorous study in the forensics setting, our
results with PRNU analysis seem to support it (Section 3.3).
2.4 Digital Watermarking
Adoption of watermarking for content authentication re-
quires two modules: an encoder which generates protected
versions of the photographs (embeds a watermark); and
a decoder which analyzes the embedded watermark and
makes a decision about content authenticity [2]. The water-
mark is typically designed to be semi-fragile, i.e., it remains in
the image when legitimate post-processing is applied (e.g.,
compression, or brightness adjustments), but is destroyed
by malicious editing (e.g., content forgery). As a result, the
watermark is typically embedded by modulating middle
frequencies, which have limited impact on image quality
but remain robust to post-processing.
Authentication watermarks allow for binary decisions.
The detector measures the presence of the expected water-
mark and deems the image (or its fragment) authentic if
the watermark is detected, or tampered if no watermark
is found. It is currently not possible to infer image editing
history based on the extracted watermark. Such function-
ality was envisioned by telltale watermarking, but hand-
crafting watermarks to facilitate such decisions turned out
to be infeasible. We are aware of only toy examples, e.g.,
a recent study designed a visible watermarking scheme for
counting of JPEG compression steps [67]. The scheme works
by placing in the image small blocks with carefully-crafted
convergence properties (stabilization of pixel changes with
successive re-compressions).
Current research explores neural network architectures
for information hiding, but at the current stage addresses
simple models for steganography [68, 69]. A recent frame-
work allows to balance embedding objectives and optimize
either for secrecy (steganography) or robustness (water-
marking) [70]. We are not aware of any efforts exploring
neural network-based optimization of authentication water-
marks.
3 NEURAL IMAGING PIPELINES
This section reviews the standard imaging pipeline, and
details how it can be replaced with its neural counterpart.
We then present the results of training 3 different neural
pipelines for several camera models. Finally, we discuss the
impact of the replacement on established forensics proto-
cols.
3.1 The standard imaging pipeline
The imaging pipeline is responsible for converting raw
sensor measurements into color images ready for display.
A typical pipeline (Fig. 2) will contain the following steps:
1) normalization and calibration which involves subtracting
the black level and division by the saturation value; 2) white
balancing which involves global adjustment of the intensities
of color components that ensures correct color perception; 3)
demosaicing which interpolates color components at unmea-
sured locations; 4) denoising which removes grain, especially
at higher ISO settings; 5) color space conversion from camera
RGB to sRGB which involves a linear matrix multiplication;
6) gamma correction which expands darker tones to account
for logarithmic perception of the human vision system.
More advanced pipelines often contain additional steps for
sophisticated tone-mapping, masking of sensor defects, or
immediate quality enhancement.
In our study, we implemented a standard pipeline in
Python and used it as the optimization target for our neural
networks. We used rawkit [72] wrappers over libRAW [73]
to access sensor measurements and meta-data in RAW
photographs. Rawkit automatically inverts the non-linear
5(a) our implementation of the standard pipeline (b) libRAW with default settings
(c) developed by the INet model (d) developed by the UNet model (e) developed by the DNet model
Fig. 3. An example full-resolution (12.3 Mpx) image developed with standard pipelines (ab) and the considered NIPs (cde): image r23beab04t shot
with Nikon D90 (Raise dataset [71]). (Full-resolution images are included as JPEGs (quality 85, 4:2:0) to limit PDF size; close-ups are included as
lossless PNGs.)
mapping of pixel intensities employed by some vendors
(the LUT parameters are available in image meta-data).
Demosaicing was performed using an adaptive algorithm
by Menon et al. [74]. Since most images in our data sets
were shot in good lighting conditions, we did not include
denoising. Due to patch-based neural network training, our
pipeline does not use any post-processing that requires
global knowledge about the image, e.g., automatic exposure
correction. An example full-resolution image developed by
our Python pipeline is shown in Fig. 3a.
3.2 The neural imaging pipeline
We replace the entire imaging pipeline with a CNN model
which develops raw sensor measurements into color RGB
images (Fig. 2). The input images are pre-process by re-
versing the nonlinear value mapping according to the cam-
era’s LUT, subtracting black levels from the edge of the
sensor, normalizing by sensor saturation values, and apply-
ing white-balancing according to shot settings. We also re-
organized the inputs by reshaping them into RGGB feature
maps of size (h2 ,
w
2 , 4) where (w, h) are the width/height
of the full-resolution raw Bayer image. This ensures well-
standardized inputs with values in [0, 1].
We considered 3 NIP models with various complexity
and design principles (Tab. 1; see supplement for detailed
architecture). INet is a simple convolutional network with
layers corresponding to successive steps of the standard
pipeline. UNet represents the popular UNet architecture [36]
adapted from [19]. DNet is an adaptation of a recent model
proposed for joint demosaicing and denoising [28]. All
considered networks are fully convolutional, and work on
inputs of arbitrary size. We take advantage of this property
during training, when we feed randomly sampled small
TABLE 1
Considered neural imaging pipelines
INet UNet DNet
# Parameters 321 7,760,268 493,976
PSNR [dB] 42.8 44.3 46.2
SSIM 0.989 0.990 0.995
Train. speed [it/s] 8.80 1.75 0.66
Train. time 17 - 26 min 2-4 h 12 - 22 h
optimization target bilinear demosaicing converged pipeline
(a) Improved demosaicing (Canon EOS 40D)
optimization target converged pipeline
(b) Improved denoising (Nikon D5100)
Fig. 4. Examples of serendipitous image quality improvements obtained
by neural imaging pipelines: (a) better demosaicing; (b) better denoising.
patches instead of full-size images. This significantly simpli-
fies training, and the networks can be used on full-resolution
inputs without any changes.
We collected a data-set with RAW images from 8 cameras
(Tab. 2). The photographs come from two public (Raise [71]
and MIT-5k [75]) and one private data-sets. For each camera,
we randomly selected 150 images with landscape orienta-
tion. For training, we used 120 full-resolution images, which
were sampled in each iteration to yield batches of 20 exam-
ples with spatial resolution 128 × 128 px. For validation,
we used a fixed set of 512 × 512 px patches extracted
from the remaining 30 images. The models were trained
to reproduce images developed by our Python pipeline
(separate model for each camera), and were penalized by the
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Fig. 5. Impact of imaging pipeline on PRNU-based forensics analysis: (a) correlation between PRNU fingerprints obtained from the same images
developed by different imaging pipelines; (b) cross-pipeline tampering localization performance (best F1 scores); (c) cross-pipeline tampering
localization example with an attempt to localize a horizontally flipped square region in the middle (forgery size 256 × 256 px; analysis window size
129× 129 px).
TABLE 2
Digital cameras used in our experiments
Camera Sensor #Images1 Source Bayer
Canon EOS 5D 12 Mpx 864 dng MIT-5k RGGB
Canon EOS 40D 10 Mpx 313 dng MIT-5k RGGB
Nikon D5100 16 Mpx 288 nef Private RGGB
Nikon D700 12 Mpx 590 dng MIT-5k RGGB
Nikon D7000 16 Mpx >1k nef Raise RGGB
Nikon D750 24 Mpx 312 nef Private RGGB
Nikon D810 36 Mpx 205 nef Private RGGB
Nikon D90 12 Mpx >1k nef Raise GBRG
1 RAW file formats: nef (Nikon); dng (generic, Adobe)
L2 loss averaged over all dimensions of the output tensor
(with patch size p):
Lnip =
1
3p2N
∑
n
‖yn − nip(xn | θnip)‖2 (1)
where: θnip are the parameters of the NIP network; xn are
the raw sensor measurements for the n-th example patch
(1 × p2 × p2 × 4 tensor); nip(xn) is the color RGB image
developed by the NIP from xn (1× p× p× 3 tensor).
All NIPs successfully reproduced target images with
high fidelity. Fig. 3 shows an example full-resolution
(12.3 Mpx) image developed with: (a) our standard Python
pipeline; (b) libRAW with default settings; (cde) the con-
sidered INet, UNet and DNet models. The resulting color
photographs are visually indistinguishable from the targets.
Objective fidelity measurements for the validation set are
collected in Tab. 1 (average over all cameras). Interestingly,
the trained models often revealed better denoising and
demosaicing performance (Fig. 4), despite the lack of de-
noising in the simulated pipeline, and the lack of explicit
optimization objectives.
Of all of the considered models, INet was the easiest
to train - not only due to its simplicity, but also because
it could be initialized with meaningful parameters that
already produced reasonably close results. We initialized
the demosaicing filters with bilinear interpolation, color
space conversion with an example multiplication matrix,
and gamma correction with a toy model separately trained
to reproduce this non-linearity. UNet was initialized ran-
domly, but improved rapidly thanks to skip connections.
DNet took the longest and for a long time had problems
with faithful color rendering. The typical training times are
reported in Tab. 1 (measured on Nvidia Tesla K80 GPUs).
The models were trained until the relative change of the
average validation loss for the last 5 epochs dropped below
10−4. The maximum number of epochs was 50,000. For
DNet we adjusted the stopping criterion to 10−5 due to
slow training that sometimes terminated prematurely with
incorrect color rendering.
3.3 Impact on Classical Forensics
In this experiment, we take advantage of multiple avail-
able pipelines and assess their impact on classical image
forensics. We use PRNU fingerprint analysis [18] (one of
the most reliable forensic techniques) which characterizes
the imaging sensor - a component of the camera which
remains unchanged across our experiments. Our evaluation
is divided into two parts with neural pipelines trained
to: (a) reproduce standard, and (b) obtain new imaging
capabilities. In the second part, we assess a NIP optimized
for low-light imaging [19].
3.3.1 Standard Pipeline Reproduction
We analyze NIPs trained to faithfully reproduce our stan-
dard Python pipeline (Section 3.2). We developed all 150
images for all pipelines and cameras. We randomly divided
the images into three sets: for PRNU estimation (90 images),
correlation predictor training (30), and evaluation (30). We
used the same split for all pipelines to ensure that the same
images are used at every stage. To speed-up processing,
we operate on 1 Mpx central crops. For our experiments,
we used the PRNU toolbox from [76, 77]. Camera finger-
prints were obtained using the standard MLE estimator with
wavelet-based denoising [78].
7TABLE 3
Cross-pipeline correlation of PRNU fingerprints for a Sony ILCE-7SM2
camera (short-long exposure mapping).
libRAW libRAW UNet Average
(long) (short) (short) PCE
libRAW (long-exposure) 1.00 0.06 0.08 470
libRAW (short-exposure) - 1.00 0.09 807
UNet (short-exposure) - - 1.00 13
We report results for Nikon D90 (we observed similar
results for other cameras; see supplement), for which we ad-
ditionally repeated UNet training 5 times to assess pipeline
stability. Fig. 5a shows cross-pipeline correlations between
camera fingerprints. Outside the diagonal, the values range
from 0.57 to 0.96 and cluster in 3 groups (the outlying 0.57,
a two large cluster around 0.75 and 0.9). Overall, libRAW
and the 4th instance of UNet revealed the weakest similarity
with the remaining pipelines. Visual inspection reveals no
differences between the output of different UNet instances.
To measure the impact of pipeline mismatch on actual
forensics tasks, we performed a cross-pipeline tampering
localization experiment. We generated synthetic tampered
photographs (for all pipelines), and used the standard tam-
pering localization protocol with camera models (PRNU
fingerprint and correlation predictors) obtained from every
pipeline. We set analysis window size to 129×129 px, stride
to 8 px, and used central-pixel attribution [76]. The tamper-
ing involved horizontally flipping a central 256 × 256 px
region. To assess tampering localization performance, we
measured the average of best F1 scores (over decision
thresholds) for 30 images per pipeline/pipeline configura-
tion.
The results (Fig. 5b) demonstrate that some of the
pipelines deliver visibly worse performance - in particular
the 2nd and 4th instances of UNet. The F1 scores range
between 0.35 and 0.51, which disappoints given favorable
setup of the experiment (same images used at every stage,
no compression, no post-processing). The qualitative impact
on tampering localization is shown in Fig. 5c which illus-
trates the obtained tampering probability maps for an ex-
ample test image. It can be observed that pipeline mismatch
can lead to visibly worse localization results - ranging from
increased background noise up to completely unreliable
results.
3.3.2 Novel Imaging Capabilities
We focus on a NIP trained to develop photographs cap-
tured in low-light conditions [19]. We used the pre-trained
UNet model available online [79]. The experiment included
two pipelines: libRAW used on short-exposure, and long-
exposure photographs, and the UNet model trained to map
from short to long exposures. Analogously to the previous
experiment, we crop a 1 Mpx square from the image center.
We used 100 randomly selected photographs for PRNU esti-
mation, and 20 images for measuring the fingerprint match
using peak-to-correlation energy (PCE). The results (Tab. 3)
show no correlation between any pairs of pipelines. While
using libRAW allowed for successful PRNU-based source
attribution (high PCE scores), the UNet model has rendered
PRNU fingerprinting ineffective. We were surprised to see
a complete lack of correlation between the two libRAW-
developed configurations. We attribute this to heavier post-
processing needed to develop reasonable images from short-
exposure photographs, and stronger contamination of the
fingerprint estimate by noise.
3.3.3 Conclusions
Our experiments indicate that adoption of complex compu-
tational models can impact existing forensic protocols, even
when they rely on traces of seemingly unaltered compo-
nents. Depending on the processing history, analysts should
take into account the imaging pipeline used to produce the
photographs. A performance penalty can be expected when
using different pipelines for building/using the models -
e.g., native JPEGs produced by the camera vs professional
dark room software (and its different vendors). Recent
research in steganography argues that photographs can
exhibit different statistics, and may need to be considered as
originating from different sources when acquisition settings
change [65, 66]. The issue deserves a separate rigorous
study, and is an interesting direction for future work.
4 END-TO-END OPTIMIZATION OF IMAGING AND
DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES
One of the main limitations of conventional forensics is
its reliance on fragile statistical traces. Down-sampling and
compression employed by media distribution channels de-
stroy most of the relevant traces and inhibit forensic analy-
sis.
The core of the proposed approach is to model the
entire acquisition and distribution channel, and optimize the
neural imaging pipeline (NIP) to facilitate photo provenance
analysis after content distribution (Fig. 1). The analysis is
performed by a forensic analysis network (FAN) which
makes decisions about the authenticity/processing history
of the analyzed photographs, and can provide feedback to
the NIP. In the presented example, the model is trained to
perform manipulation detection, i.e., to classify images as
either straight from the camera, or as affected by a certain
post-processing operation. The distribution channel mimics
the behavior of modern photo sharing services and social
networks which habitually down-sample and re-compress
photographs. As will be demonstrated later, forensic analy-
sis in such conditions is unreliable.
The parameters of the NIP are updated to guarantee both
faithful representation of target color photographs (L2 loss),
and accurate decisions in post-distribution forensic analysis
(cross-entropy loss). Hence, the minimized loss function L
can be expressed as:
L = Lfan + λLnip (2a)
Lfan =
1
N
∑
n
∑
c
log
(
fanc(dc(nip(xn | θnip)) | θfan)
)
(2b)
Lnip =
1
3whN
∑
n
2552‖yn − nip(xn | θnip)‖2 (2c)
where: θnip/fan are the parameters of the NIP and FAN
networks, respectively; xn are the raw sensor measurements
for the n-th example patch; yn is the corresponding target
color image; nip(xn) is the image developed by the NIP
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Fig. 6. Implementation of JPEG compression as a fully differentiable dJPEG module: (a) continuous approximations of the rounding function; (b)-(d)
validation of the dJPEG module against the standard libJPEG library with standard rounding, and the harmonic and sinusoidal approximations; (e)
an example image patch; (f) standard JPEG compression with quality 50; (g)-(h) dJPEG-compressed patches with the harmonic and sinusoidal
approximations.
from xn; dc() denotes an image processed by manipulation
c; fanc() is the probability that an image belongs to the
c-th manipulation class, as estimated by the FAN model.
Computation of the L2 loss with signals in the [0,255]
range makes the loss components more easily comparable,
and simplifies the choice of regularization strength λ. By
changing λ, we can control the trade-off between the image
fidelity and forensics’ accuracy.
4.1 Modeling the Distribution Channel
In our experiment, the RGB image developed by the NIP
can undergo one of 4 possible manipulations before it is
sent through a distribution channel (see Sec. 4.3 for manipu-
lation details). The channel is modeled as subsequent down-
sampling by factor 1:2 and JPEG compression - a combina-
tion that is habitually used by online photo sharing services.
To enable end-to-end optimization of the entire acquisition
and distribution channel, we need to ensure that every
processing step remains differentiable. The main problem
is JPEG compression, which requires approximation. Our
channel uses quality level 50, which PSNR-wise corresponds
to approx. quality 80 of the standard codec (see Fig. 6d).
4.2 Approximation of JPEG Compression
We designed a dJPEG model which approximates the stan-
dard JPEG codec, and expresses its successive steps as
matrix multiplications or convolution layers that can be
implemented in TensorFlow (see supplementary materials
for a detailed network architecture):
• RGB to/from YCbCr color-space conversions are im-
plemented as 1× 1 convolutions.
• Isolation of 8 × 8 blocks for independent processing
is implemented by combining space-to-depth and re-
shaping operations.
• 2D discrete cosine transforms are implemented by
matrix multiplication (DxDT where x denotes an 8×
8 array, and D is the transformation matrix).
• Division/multiplication of DCT coefficients by the
corresponding quantization steps are implemented
as element-wise operations with tiled and concate-
nated quantization matrices (both the luminance and
chrominance channels).
• The actual quantization is approximated by a contin-
uous function ρ(x) - see details below.
The key problem in making JPEG fully differentiable
lies in the rounding of DCT coefficients. Initially, we ex-
perimented with a Taylor series expansion, which can be
made arbitrarily accurate by including more terms. Finally,
we decided to use a smoother, and simpler sinusoidal ap-
proximation obtained by matching the phase of a sinusoid
with the sawtooth function:
ρ(x) = x− sin(2pix)
2pi
(3)
Both approximations are shown in Fig. 6a.
The dJPEG model relies on standard quantization ma-
trices, derived from a desired quality level. We validated
our model by comparing output images with a reference
codec from libJPEG. The results are shown in Fig. 6bcd for
standard rounding, and the two approximations, respec-
tively. We used 5 terms for the harmonic approximation. The
developed module produces equivalent compression results
with standard rounding, and a good approximation for its
differentiable variants. Fig. 6e-h show a visual comparison
of an example image patch, and its libJPEG and dJPEG-
compressed counterparts.
4.3 Image Manipulation
Our experiment mirrors the standard setup for image ma-
nipulation detection [48, 80, 81]. We consider four mild
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Fig. 7. An example image patch with all of the considered manipulation
variants: (a) just after the manipulation; (b) after the distribution channel
(down-sampling and JPEG compression).
post-processing operations, which may be used to mask the
traces of a prospective forgery:
• sharpening - implemented as an unsharp mask oper-
ator with the following kernel:
1
6
[−1 −4 −1
−4 26 −4
−1 −4 −1
]
(4)
applied to the luminance channel in the HSV color
space.
• resampling - implemented as successive down-
sampling and up-sampling using bilinear interpola-
tion and scaling factors 1:2 and 2:1.
• Gaussian filtering - implemented using a convolu-
tional layer with a 5×5 filter and standard deviation
0.83.
• JPG compression - implemented using dJPEG with
sinusoidal rounding approximation and quality level
80.
Fig. 7 shows post-processed variants of an example
image patch: (a) just after manipulation; and (b) after the
distribution channel (as seen by the FAN model).
4.4 The Forensic Analysis Network
The forensic analysis network (FAN) is implemented as
a CNN following the most recent recommendations on
construction of neural networks for forensics analysis [48].
Bayar and Stamm have proposed a new layer type, which
constrains the learned filters to be valid residual filters [48].
Adoption of the layer helps ignore visual content and facil-
itates extraction of forensically-relevant low-level features.
In summary, our network operates on 128×128×3 patches
in the RGB color space and includes (see supplementary
materials for a complete network architecture):
• A constrained convolutions layer learning 5×5 resid-
ual filters and with no activation function.
• Four 5× 5 convolutional layers with doubling num-
ber of feature maps (starting from 32). The layers use
leaky ReLU activation and are followed by 2×2 max
pooling.
• A 1×1 convolutional layer mapping 256 features into
256 features for each spatial location.
• A global average pooling layer reducing the total
number of features to 256.
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Fig. 8. Typical progression of validation metrics (Nikon D90) for stan-
dalone FAN training (F) and joint optimization of FAN and NIP models
(F+N).
• Two fully connected layers with 512 and 128 nodes
activated by leaky ReLU.
• A fully connected layer with C = 5 output nodes
and softmax activation.
In total, the network has 1,341,990 parameters. The network
yields as an output the probabilities that characterize the
processing history of each patch (4 considered manipulation
classes + unprocessed/straight from the camera).
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We start our evaluation by validating the implemented FAN
model. Initially, we use the network to detect image manip-
ulations (Sec. 4.3) without a distribution channel (Sec. 5.1).
Then, we perform extensive evaluation of the entire acqui-
sition and distribution workflow (Sec. 5.2) and demonstrate
the benefits of jointly optimizing the FAN and NIP models.
5.1 FAN Model Validation
To validate our FAN model, we used it to directly dis-
criminate between the manipulated patches (no distribution
channel distortion, as in [48]). We used the UNet model as
the imaging pipeline, and adjusted the raw input size to
guarantee same-size inputs to the FAN (128× 128× 3 RGB
images). In such conditions, the model yields classification
accuracy of 99%, which is consistent with [48].
5.2 Imaging Pipeline Optimization
Our main experiment addresses discrimination of manip-
ulation classes at the end of a distribution channel where
down-sampling and lossy compression make it more chal-
lenging to tell the manipulations apart (Fig. 7). We consider
two optimization modes: (F) only the FAN network is
optimized given a fixed NIP model; (F+N) both the FAN
and NIP models are optimized jointly. In the latter mode,
we use the regularization strength λ to control the trade-off
between image fidelity and classification accuracy. In both
cases, the NIPs are pre-initialized with previously trained
models (Section 3).
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Fig. 9. Trade-off between the photo development fidelity (in PSNR [dB]) and the forensic decision accuracy (FAN accuracy at the end of the
distribution channel) for regularization strength λ between 10−4 and 100. Each configuration was trained 10 times with different random parameter
initialization.
Similarly to previous experiments, we used 120 images
for training, and the remaining 30 images for validation.
In each iteration we randomly extract new patches from
full-resolution training images. The validation set is fixed at
the beginning and includes 100 random patches per image
(3,000 in total) for classification accuracy assessment. To
speed-up evaluation, we used 2 random patches per image
(60 in total) for image quality assessment1. To prevent over-
representation of empty content, we reject patches with
pixel variance < 0.01, and keep the ones with variance
< 0.02 with 50% chance. More diverse patches are always
accepted.
We performed the experiment for 4 cameras (Canon EOS
40D and EOS 5D, and Nikon D7000, and D90 - see Tab. 2).
To assess optimization trade-offs, we tested 11 values of
the regularization strength λ ranging from 10−4 up to 1.
Each run was repeated 10 times with random initialization
of FAN’s parameters. Due to computational constraints, we
ran the optimization for 1,000 epochs, starting with a learn-
ing rate of 10−4 and systematically decreasing by 15% every
100 epochs. This was enough for consistent convergence
of INet and UNet models (Fig. 8). For some regularization
strengths λ, the DNet model could potentially benefit from
longer training.
In the standalone (F) optimization mode, the FAN de-
livers only ≈ 45% accuracy after the distribution channel
(see Tab. 4a for a typical confusion matrix). This result is
stable across all cameras and pipelines. In the (F+M) mode,
we observed consistent improvements. Due to limited ex-
pressive power, the INet model delivered marginal gains in
accuracy - up to ≈ 55% with a reasonable image distortion.
The DNet and UNet models allowed to boost manipulation
1. We measured both the PSNR and SSIM metrics. However, we omit
SSIM results since they show the same qualitative behavior as PSNR.
Moreover, due to a wider range of metric values, the discussed effects
are better visible in PSNR measurements.
detection accuracy to ≈ 75% and ≈ 90%, respectively. Given
more permissive quality constraints, both models allow for
nearly perfect manipulation detection. Hence, we focus on
these two models.
A typical progression of validation metrics (classification
accuracy and distortion PSNR) for the UNet model is shown
in Fig. 8 (sampled every 50 epochs). In the (F) optimization
mode, classification accuracy saturates at ≈ 45%. Similar
effect can be observed for joint (F+N) optimization with
strong regularization (λ = 1), which saturates at the same
level, but leads to slow improvements in image quality
(which indicates that the pre-trained NIP models can be
slightly improved given longer training time). Intermediate
regularization strengths allow to trade image fidelity for
reliable manipulation detection. For λ = 10−1 and 10−2
the classification accuracy saturates at 92% and 98%, re-
spectively. The DNet model exhibited similar behavior, but
converged slower and eventually yielded a worse quality-
performance trade-off (Fig. 9).
To facilitate forensic analysis, the joint (F+N) optimiza-
tion mode learns to introduce carefully crafted distortions
at the time of photo development. Fig. 9 shows the quality-
accuracy trade-offs for all of the evaluated models. The
obtained curves are promising, and suggest that only minor
quality degradation may be sufficient to obtain significant
gains in manipulation detection performance. UNet im-
proved rapidly for all camera models, and reached classi-
fication accuracy ≈ 90% while maintaining average image
representation fidelity of ≈ 42.5 dB (λ = 0.1). Typical
confusion matrices for various regularization strengths are
shown in Tab. 4. DNet delivered worse performance, and
visually acceptable distortion resulted in forensics accuracy
of ≈ 75%. We acknowledge that actual visibility of the
introduced artifacts depends on image content, and tends
to be masked in textured areas.
Qualitative illustration of the observed artifacts is shown
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Fig. 10. Example image patches (128×128 px) developed by a standard NIP yˆ0n and by a NIP jointly optimized with a FAN model yˆ∗n. The difference
between the patches reveals periodic distortion patterns, which manifest themselves as regularly spaced modulation of the FFT frequencies (see
difference between FFT amplitude spectra). The spectra are shown shown in logarithmic scale f(x) = log(10 + |x|).
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TABLE 4
Typical confusion matrices (Nikon D90). Entries ≈ 0 are not shown;
entries < 3% are marked with (*).
(a) standalone FAN opt. (UNet)→ 44.6%
True
Predicted na
t.
sh
a.
ga
u.
jp
g
re
s.
native 36 17 14 23 10
sharpen 5 91 * * *
gaussian 11 3 50 15 21
jpg 34 16 14 25 11
resample 19 6 30 25 21
(b) joint FAN+NIP opt. (UNet) λ = 0.25→ 87.0%
True
Predicted na
t.
sh
a.
ga
u.
jp
g
re
s.
native 77 * * 20
sharpen * 98
gaussian * 93 6
jpg 23 * 3 73
resample * * 3 94
(c) joint FAN+NIP opt. (UNet) λ = 0.1→ 92.6%
True
Predicted na
t.
sh
a.
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u.
jp
g
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s.
native 85 * 13
sharpen * 97 *
gaussian 6 93
jpg 6 * 91
resample 3 97
(d) joint FAN+NIP opt. (UNet) λ = 0.05→ 95.8%
True
Predicted na
t.
sh
a.
ga
u.
jp
g
re
s.
native 94 * 4
sharpen * 97 * *
gaussian * 98 *
jpg 8 * 90
resample 100
in Fig. 10, which shows diverse image patches (128×128 px)
from various cameras. Corresponding results for UNet and
DNet are shown in the top and bottom sections, respectively.
For both models, we chose regularization strengths which
lead to reasonable image quality (expected manipulation
detection accuracy of ≈ 90% and ≈ 75% for UNet and DNet,
respectively). The first 3 columns correspond to: the desired
output image used as optimization target yn; the output
of a pre-trained NIP model yˆ0n = nip(xn | θ0nip); and the
(distorted) output of a NIP optimized for forensic analysis
yˆ∗n = nip(xn | θ∗nip).
The considered NIP architectures lead to distinctive dis-
tortion patterns. For UNet the artifacts assume the form
of periodic horizontal (or vertical) patterns (best seen in
the difference image |yˆ0n − yˆ∗n|). Spectral analysis shows
modulation of regularly spaced frequencies in the 2D FFT
spectra F(|yˆ∗n− yn|). The spectral location of the distortions
can be best observed in the difference between the spectra:
∆F = ||F(yˆ0n)| − |F(yˆ∗n)||,
shown in the last column. (For better clarity, the spectra are
presented in logarithmic intensity f(x) = log(10 + |x|).)
DNet introduces a more pleasant distortion resembling a
wavy textured pattern. However, the model seems to be
more sensitive than UNet and for lower regularization
strengths looses sharpness (this effect can already be ob-
served in Fig. 10 where differences along some edges domi-
nates over the regular distortion of interest). Spectral analy-
sis reveals distribution of the artifacts across a wider range
of frequencies, but exhibits a similar pattern - modulation of
regularly spaced frequencies along either the horizontal or
vertical direction.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our work explores optimization of imaging pipelines with
explicit provenance analysis objectives. We have demon-
strated that such an approach can successfully address reli-
ability problems with conventional forensic analysis in com-
plex distribution channels. We performed end-to-end, joint
optimization of a forensic analysis network and a neural
imaging pipeline, and obtained significant improvements
in photo manipulation detection, whose accuracy increased
from ≈ 45% for state-of-the-art forensic to over 90%.
The improvement comes at the cost of image quality,
as the enhanced photo analysis capabilities rely on learned
artifacts in the developed photographs. Analysis of perfor-
mance trade-offs indicates that minor fidelity deterioration
is sufficient to get significant benefits. In this work we ana-
lyzed image patches in isolation, but in practical settings the
final decision about an image should integrate intermediate
predictions from multiple regions. Given all of the above,
we believe that the proposed approach presents a promising
line of research.
The learned artifacts bear resemblance to digital water-
marking, which also relies on carefully crafted distortions
to carry copyright or authentication side-information. How-
ever, authentication watermarks need to be hand-crafted
with allowed post-processing in mind, and allow only for
binary decisions based on the watermark detection strength.
Our approach represents the entire acquisition and dis-
tribution workflow as a single, fully-differentiable model
which can be optimized end-to-end to enable more complex
analysis. This opens new capabilities compared to existing
technologies.
Spectral analysis indicates interesting qualitative differ-
ences between the hand-crafted distortions in digital water-
marks, and machine-learned artifacts. While watermarking
systems were typically designed by designating spectral
sub-bands (most often in middle frequencies) intended for
information embedding, the distortions that we observed
were regularly spaced across all frequencies. A rigorous
comparison of the human-designed and machine-learned
information hiding strategies constitutes another exciting
prospect for future work.
The proposed approach aims to exploit neural imaging
processors, which are an emerging trend in the design
of novel digital cameras [82, 83]. We believe exploiting
new computational capabilities to facilitate reliable photo
authentication is an important direction of future work.
Increasing adoption of computational methods in camera
design bears the risk of invalidating many forensic analysis
protocols. In our evaluation, we observed that adoption of
neural imaging can have a major impact on PRNU analysis
- one of the most reliable forensic tools to date. In the
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most optimistic setting where the NIP is trained to repro-
duce the results of a conventional pipeline, we observed
non-negligible impact on the extracted sensor fingerprints.
This can translate to diminished reliability of such anal-
ysis in case of pipeline mismatch. A NIP optimized for
novel imaging capabilities has rendered sensor fingerprint-
ing completely ineffective. A rigorous assessment of this
phenomenon is another interesting topic for future research,
especially with the increasing adoption of such technologies
in contemporary devices [20].
Overall, we believe the proposed approach opens many
exciting research opportunities. In our future work, we’re
planning to explore techniques that could allow for better
control over performance trade-offs and image distortion
patterns. We will also focus on designing training proto-
cols that would translate to good generalization to various
forensics tasks, and more diverse distribution channels.
Finally, it may be worth to consider expansion of end-to-end
optimization capabilities to include the compression codecs
used in the distribution channels.
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1 SOURCE CODE
Our neural imaging toolbox is available at https://github.com/pkorus/neural-imaging.
2 CONTENTS
• Impact of neural imaging pipelines on PRNU-based forensics (all cameras)
• Detailed validation statistics for all tested configurations of the improved pipelines
• Fidelity-accuracy trade-offs (both PSNR and SSIM)
• Detailed comparison of different variants of learned distortions - both UNet and DNet models
• Neural network architectures (INet, DNet, UNet, dJPEG, FAN)
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Fig. 1. Impact of imaging pipeline on PRNU-based forensics analysis (a) correlation between PRNU fingerprints obtained from the same images
developed by different imaging pipelines; (b) cross-pipeline tampering localization performance (best F1 scores); (c) cross-pipeline tampering
localization example with an attempt to localize a horizontally flipped square region in the middle (forgery size 256 × 256 px; analysis window size
129× 129 px).
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TABLE 1
Validation metrics for all training configurations (averaged over 10 repetitions),
Camera λ DNet UNet
PSNR [dB] SSIM [0, 1] FAN acc. [%] PSNR [dB] SSIM [0, 1] FAN acc. [%]
Canon EOS 40D 0.0001 26.7 0.838 0.964 30.9 0.900 0.9920.0005 30.9 0.906 0.961 33.9 0.942 0.986
0.001 32.3 0.923 0.953 35.8 0.960 0.984
0.005 36.8 0.969 0.907 39.2 0.979 0.981
0.01 38.2 0.976 0.867 39.8 0.982 0.948
0.05 41.3 0.988 0.741 41.6 0.987 0.931
0.1 42.5 0.991 0.553 42.2 0.988 0.877
0.25 43.5 0.993 0.392 43.2 0.990 0.384
0.5 43.6 0.993 0.382 43.3 0.990 0.382
1 43.6 0.993 0.381 43.3 0.990 0.378
- 41.5 0.991 0.383 42.3 0.989 0.382
Canon EOS 5D 0.0001 26.7 0.838 0.950 30.5 0.889 0.9570.0005 30.4 0.897 0.957 34.6 0.948 0.951
0.001 32.0 0.923 0.951 35.7 0.961 0.989
0.005 36.3 0.961 0.898 39.4 0.981 0.984
0.01 37.9 0.971 0.873 40.0 0.984 0.973
0.05 40.7 0.982 0.760 42.2 0.989 0.953
0.1 41.7 0.985 0.649 42.6 0.990 0.901
0.25 42.7 0.987 0.500 43.2 0.991 0.779
0.5 43.0 0.987 0.464 43.5 0.991 0.582
1 43.0 0.987 0.454 43.7 0.991 0.458
- 42.5 0.984 0.445 43.1 0.991 0.449
Nikon D7000 0.0001 27.8 0.830 0.986 30.1 0.891 0.9570.0005 31.2 0.907 0.958 34.9 0.949 0.975
0.001 33.3 0.934 0.960 36.0 0.960 0.993
0.005 37.3 0.970 0.910 39.8 0.982 0.985
0.01 38.9 0.980 0.862 40.9 0.986 0.979
0.05 42.4 0.990 0.794 42.7 0.990 0.952
0.1 43.2 0.992 0.691 43.0 0.990 0.875
0.25 44.6 0.994 0.505 44.1 0.992 0.437
0.5 44.9 0.994 0.448 44.2 0.992 0.421
1 44.9 0.994 0.445 44.2 0.992 0.420
- 44.4 0.994 0.444 43.7 0.992 0.421
Nikon D90 0.0001 26.6 0.808 0.938 29.3 0.865 0.9990.0005 31.0 0.898 0.973 32.9 0.928 0.991
0.001 32.8 0.922 0.932 35.0 0.953 0.991
0.005 36.5 0.965 0.910 38.9 0.978 0.983
0.01 37.9 0.975 0.870 39.8 0.982 0.977
0.05 41.3 0.987 0.747 42.0 0.988 0.950
0.1 42.5 0.990 0.639 42.3 0.989 0.920
0.25 43.5 0.992 0.485 42.8 0.990 0.799
0.5 43.8 0.992 0.455 43.3 0.991 0.511
1 43.8 0.992 0.446 43.4 0.991 0.446
- 43.1 0.992 0.448 43.0 0.990 0.450
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Fig. 2. Trade-off between the photo development fidelity (PSNR) and the forensic decision accuracy (FAN accuracy at the end of the distribution
channel) for regularization strength λ between 10−4 and 100. Each configuration was trained 10 times with different random parameter initialization.
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Fig. 3. Trade-off between the photo development fidelity (SSIM) and the forensic decision accuracy (FAN accuracy at the end of the distribution
channel) for regularization strength λ between 10−4 and 100. Each configuration was trained 10 times with different random parameter initialization.
vPre-trained (DNet) λ = 0.1 (42.5 dB, 0.64%) λ = 0.05 (41.3 dB, 0.75%) λ = 0.01 (37.9 dB, 0.87%) λ = 0.001 (32.8 dB, 0.92%)
Fig. 4. Variations in the learned distortions across training repetitions for various regularization strengths (DNet model); reported validation
metrics correspond to average values across all repetitions; for the pre-trained NIP the illustrated spectrum corresponds to the difference w.r.t.
the optimization target; for the optimized NIPs, we show the difference between the spectra.
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Fig. 5. Variations in the learned distortions across training repetitions for various regularization strengths (UNet model); reported validation
metrics correspond to average values across all repetitions; for the pre-trained NIP the illustrated spectrum corresponds to the difference w.r.t.
the optimization target; for the optimized NIPs, we show the difference between the spectra.
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TABLE 2
The INet architecture: 321 trainable parameters
Operation Activation Initialization Function Output size
Input - - RGGB feature maps N × h
2
× w
2
× 4
1× 1 convolution - hand-crafted binary sample selection1 Reorganizes data for up-sampling N × h
2
× w
2
× 12
Depth to space - - Up-sampling N × h× w × 3
5× 5 convolution - zero-padded 3× 3 bilinear kernel Demosaicing N × h× w × 3
1× 1 convolution - sample color conversion matrix Color-space conversion (sRGB) N × h× w × 3
1× 1 convolution tanh pre-trained model Gamma correction2 N × h× w × 12
1× 1 convolution - pre-trained model Gamma correction2 N × h× w × 3
Clip to [0,1] - - output RGB image N × h× w × 3
1 we disabled optimization of this filter to speed up convergence
2 adapted from a 2-layer network trained separately to approximate gamma correction
TABLE 3
The UNet architecture: 7,760,268 trainable parameters
Operation Activation Input Output Output size
Input - - x N × h/2× w/2× 4
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU x c1,1 N × h/2× w/2× 32
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c1,1 c1,2 N × h/2× w/2× 32
2× 2 max pooling - c1,2 p1 N × h/4× w/4× 32
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU p1 c2,1 N × h/4× w/4× 64
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c2,1 c2,2 N × h/4× w/4× 64
2× 2 max pooling - c2,2 p2 N × h/8× w/8× 32
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU p2 c3,1 N × h/8× w/8× 128
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c3,1 c3,2 N × h/8× w/8× 128
2× 2 max pooling - c3,2 p3 N × h/16× w/16× 128
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU p3 c4,1 N × h/16× w/16× 256
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c4,1 c4,2 N × h/16× w/16× 256
2× 2 max pooling - c4,2 p4 N × h/32× w/32× 256
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU p4 c5,1 N × h/32× w/32× 512
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c5,1 c5,2 N × h/32× w/32× 512
2× 2 strided convolution - c5,2 s5 N × h/16× w/16× 256
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU s5 | c4,2 c6,1 N × h/16× w/16× 256
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c6,1 c6,2 N × h/16× w/16× 256
2× 2 strided convolution - c6,2 s6 N × h/8× w/8× 128
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU s6 | c3,2 c7,1 N × h/8× w/8× 128
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c7,1 c7,2 N × h/8× w/8× 128
2× 2 strided convolution - c7,2 s7 N × h/4× w/4× 64
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU s7 | c2,2 c8,1 N × h/4× w/4× 64
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c8,1 c8,2 N × h/4× w/4× 64
2× 2 strided convolution - c7,2 s8 N × h/2× w/2× 32
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU s8 | c1,2 c9,1 N × h/2× w/2× 32
3× 3 convolution leaky ReLU c9,1 c9,2 N × h/2× w/2× 32
1× 1 convolution - c9,2 c10 N × h/2× w/2× 12
Depth to space - c10 yrgb N × h× w × 3
Clip to [0,1] - yrgb y N × h× w × 3
All leaky ReLUs have α = 0.2
| denotes concatenation along the feature dimension
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TABLE 4
The DNet architecture: 493,976 trainable parameters
Operation Activation Input Output Output size
Input - - c0 N × h/2× w/2× 4
Repeat for i = 1, 2, . . . , 14 {
3× 3 convolution + BN ReLU ci−1 cˆi N × h/2− 2× w/2− 2× 64
Padding (reflection) - cˆi ci N × h/2× w/2× 64
}
3× 3 convolution + BN ReLU c14 cˆ15 N × h/2− 2× w/2− 2× 12
Padding (reflection) - cˆ15 c15 N × h/2× w/2× 12
Depth to space - c15 fconv N × h× w × 3
1× 1 convolution - c0 c16 N × h/2× w/2× 12
Depth to space - c16 fbayer N × h× w × 3
3× 3 convolution ReLU fconv | fbayer cˆ17 N × h− 2× w − 2× 64
Padding (reflection) - cˆ17 c17 N × h× w × 64
1× 1 convolution - c17 yrgb N × h× w × 3
Clip to [0,1] - yrgb y N × h× w × 3
| denotes concatenation along the feature dimension
TABLE 5
The dJPEG architecture for JPEG codec approximation
Operation JPEG Function Output size
Input - N × h× w × 3
1× 1 convolution RGB→ YCbCr N × h× w × 3
Space to depth & reshapes Isolate 8× 8 px blocks 3N × 8× 8×B
Transpose & reshape - 3BN × 8× 8
2 × matrix multiplication Forward 2D DCT 3BN × 8× 8
Element-wise matrix division Divide by quantization matrices 3BN × 8× 8
Rounding / approximate rounding Quantization 3BN × 8× 8
Element-wise matrix multiplication Multiply by quantization matrices 3BN × 8× 8
2 × matrix multiplication Inverse 2D DCT 3BN × 8× 8
Transpose & reshape - 3N × 8× 8×B
Depth to space & reshapes Re-assemble 8× 8 px blocks N × h× w × 3
1× 1 convolution YCbCr→ RGB N × h× w × 3
TABLE 6
The FAN architecture: 1,341,990 trainable parameters
Operation Activation Initialization Comment Output size
Input - - RGB input N × h× w × 3
5× 5 convolution - Standard residual filter1 Constrained convolution N × h× w × 3
5× 5 convolution leaky ReLU MSRA - N × h× w × 32
2× 2 max pool - - - N × h/2× w/2× 32
5× 5 convolution leaky ReLU MSRA - N × h/2× w/2× 64
2× 2 max pool - - - N × h/4× w/4× 64
5× 5 convolution leaky ReLU MSRA - N × h/4× w/4× 128
2× 2 max pool - - - N × h/8× w/8× 128
5× 5 convolution leaky ReLU MSRA - N × h/8× w/8× 256
2× 2 max pool - - - N × h/16× w/16× 256
1× 1 convolution leaky ReLU MSRA - N × h/16× w/16× 256
global average pooling - - - N × 256
fully connected leaky ReLU MSRA - N × 512
fully connected leaky ReLU MSRA - N × 128
fully connected Softmax MSRA Class probabilities N × 5
